The Surge: America's Military Success, Iraq's Political Failure

"I have more fear of our own errors than of our enemies' designs."
-- Pericles

From the standpoint of the American military brass, the Surge has been a boon. Every measurable statistic has demonstrated that security has improved and that violence is in a downward trend. However, the five additional U.S. combat brigades sent to Baghdad last year and General David Petreus cannot take all the credit for the success.

The much ballyhooed Sunni Awakening has been the major difference maker and for this we can thank Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda overplayed its hand and forgot that they fight, like the Americans do, at the pleasure of the Iraqis. AQI's murderous campaign of intimidation, supression and Salafism alienated its Sunni patrons. Without Iraqi support, Al Qaeda's foreign fighters lost their ability to blend into Sunni communities and have become much easier targets for American forces, Iraqi Security Forces and Sunni Awakening militias.

The Surge combined with the timely Sunni Awakening has given us a glimpse of what is possible if Americans and all the sects of Iraq unite for a common purpose. At the moment Al Qaeda is stumbling and even retreating.

However, this momentum is not sustainable without progress on the political front and the marriage of convenience between the Sunni tribesmen and American forces has already shown its fragility. Thousands of Sunni fighters left their posts because of a skirmish between American forces that ended with a handful of Sunnis dead. Sunni leaders also complain of late per diem payments and a lack of weapons and vehicles. Some in the Diyala province have already threatened to leave the American fold and join up with Al Qaeda once again. Immediate political reconciliation is the way to stop the degradation of this alliance.

Tragically, though, political reconciliation between Iraq's three major sects is at a complete standstill. While the Kurds are content to be left to their own devices in the North, the Shiite-dominated central government distrusts the Sunni Awakening movement and not without good reason. The Shiite majority and Kurdish minority had spent the better part of thirty years as oppressed underclasses to the Sunni minority in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Many of those in the Sunni Awakening movement are former Ba'ath party members and Saddam supporters whose distaste for the current Shiite rulers is no secret.

As long as Iraqis are more afraid of each other than of an external threat, political reconciliation is a burden rather than a necessity. It is because of this internal distrust that the majority of the American troops should be withdrawn from Iraq as soon as possible, with some combat troops left to guard US interests. US troops should be stationed within striking distance, assuming the role of the external threat. The State Department would then release a clear dictat that any action that compromises the territorial integrity of Iraq would be greeted with unabashed force, effectively ruling out the possibility of breaking apart the country. Left with the choice between politcal reconciliation or a conflict with its primary ally, a united Iraq is the inevitable outcome.

The United States must capitalize on the opening the Sunni Awakening has given it and the Iraqi people. Americans should not and can no longer be a flotation device for an Iraq that refuses to do what is best for itself. It is time for the Iraqi state to sink or swim.